In 1977 whilst I was working with the Medical Research Council (MRC), the Public Health Laboratory Service (PHLS) approached me to join the PHLS on a permanent staff basis. I was assured that I would be able to continue working on slow virus research as long as my research did not interfere with my routine clinical diagnostic work. I had the freedom to pursue my research interests as long as they did not cause any strain on the PHLS budget.
I would undertake a lot of this work in my own time and I would also spend a significant part of my time at PHLS in researching slow viruses. Everyone at PHLS was aware of my activities and they were generally accepted as being important and of benefit to PHLS generally.
However, after BSE surfaced the views on SE’s, which I had formed as a result of my researches, did not coincide with the established view. Prior to my dismissal from PHLS on the grounds of redundancy, my researches were effectively ground to a halt for several years because I was the subject of disciplinary proceedings. These disciplinary procedures lasted for several years.
PHLS Directors, Drs Smith and Wolford in their statements to the BSE Inquiry admitted that they acting under instruction given by the Health Minister Stephen Dorrell, ultimately withdrew my freedom to research.
Between 1970 and 1987, I examined the brains of all CJD victims in the North East region (which included Leeds, Sheffield, Carlisle and Berwick). There were only seven victims during this period.
In 1988, I saw a change in pattern in the new CJD cases. The number of cases increased considerably. In 1988 alone there were 4 victims and the number of victims continued at this level in later years, even though the geographical area which I was covering, was reduced (I only covered cases north of Middlesbrough).
In addition, there was a change in the distribution of lesions in the brains, in particular affecting the cerebellum. There was also a change in clinical presentation.
All these factors concerned me considerably and I classified the cases as "atypical".
As atypical cases surfaced from 1988 onwards I started work on experiments with CJD brains using transmission studies in animals. I injected hamsters and mice with brain tissue from CJD victims with a view to studying the variations in the incubation period and lesions in different strains of mice, which would reveal the source, and origin of the agent. I had my own animal house facilities at PHLS. By 1990 these experiments were well advanced and were giving clear preliminary indications when animals were becoming ill. Dr Lightfoot of PHLS ordered me to destroy the animals. When I refused to do so he had them destroyed in 1990. He made the animal house attendant redundant and soon after he rented the animal house to MCR although it had been designed and built for my experimental requirements. Had these experiments been completed in their entirety and had the preliminary indications been confirmed we would have been in no doubt about the link between BSE and CJD and many lives could have been saved.
Dr Smith Director PHLS told me, that I should not under any circumstances talk to the press about my views on BSE/CJD. I was instructed to refer all enquiries to the PHLS press officer. He also told me that all scientific papers must be cleared by PHLS before submission.
The kind of experiments I began in 1990 had been restarted by MAFF in 1996, using brain material from some of the recently announced "new strain" CJD cases. These experiments will provide the first direct proof of a link between BSE and CJD. SEAC has stated that this is the most important experiment ever to be carried out on BSE and CJD. If this is the case why were my experiments destroyed?
On the 22nd December 1989 I made an application to MAFF for a grant of £10,000 over two years to fund the evaluation of a touch test. This test would have stopped contaminated meat going into the human food chain. My application was rejected on the grounds of limited funding.
Within a matter of days, the Minister announced some £10 million additional funds for BSE research. The following day I telephoned MAFF (Mr McGovern) asking for further details of these funds but was told that the money had already been spoken for.
Ray Bradley, BSE research co-ordinator for MAFF, told me in January 1990 that BSE and scrapie in sheep are the same and therefore, there was no risk to humans. It was a dead-end disease as far as humans were concerned. He told me my test was very sensitive, too sensitive and that the Minister was fully aware that affected cattle were going through the abattoirs. The Minister did not want my rubber stamp merely to prove cattle were affected. When I suggested that we might do the study privately for our own knowledge to find out what percentage of animals were infected, Mr Bradley cautioned me that the results would eventually become public knowledge and this would caise a big headache for MAFF and the Government.
PHLS and Dr Lightfoot in particular, tried to impose strict rules on public comment. On 21 May 1990 Dr David Clark MP raised this question in the House of Commons during a BSE debate.
Mr Gummer: "The Hon. Member of South Shields did himself a grave disservice by suggesting that I was in any way trying to stop anyone saying anything that he would previously have been able to say. I ask the Hon. Gentleman to withdraw his allegation, which has caused considerable concern to the scientists in my Department, who would not work on the basis that the Hon. Gentleman has said that I suggested. If the Hon. Gentleman will not withdraw, he underlines the fact that almost everything he says merely springs from his own fantasy and is not the fact of the matter."
Dr David Clark: "May I clarify the matter? I said that the Government scientists have been told not to speak to Members of Parliament or the press on this issue. The person in question, whom I have in mind, was telephoned in the middle of the night and told that. If the Minister is prepared to get a letter from the Head of the Government, the Prime Minister, assuring me that that individual will not be sacked as he was threatened, will not be reprimanded and will not have his career jeopardised, I will talk to that person to see whether he is prepared to let me name him. When we are dealing with a Government who, in their own words, are economical with the truth, I must have that from the Prime Minister. I as the person referred to."
However, in the evidence given to the BSE inquiry by Dr J Smith (Retired) and Diana Wolford Directors of the PHLS in the evidence given to the BSE inquiry wrote that Mr Dorrell has indicated to PHLS and made clear, PHLS should not "be seen to work or to comment on the subject."
On 27th March 1990 a meeting, which I had organised in September 1989, took place at Newcastle General Hospital. Dr Lightfoot wanted me to cancel this meeting. He said that unnecessary alarm would be caused if I talked about a possible link between BSE and CJD. However, since the meeting had already been arranged, it duly went ahead.
The kind of experiments I began in 1990 had been restarted by MAFF in 1996, using brain material from some of the recently announced "new strain" CJD cases. These experiments will provide the first direct proof of a link between BSE and CJD. SEAC has stated that this is the most important experiment ever to be carried out on BSE and CJD. If this is the case why my experiment were destroyed?
In July 1990 in a memorandum to the House of Commons, I suggested a way forward: None of my recommendations were followed.
1) BSE in cattle appeared due to the addition of cattle remains to cattle feed containing the scrapie agent from both sheep and cattle (cannibalism).
2) BSE is different from the scrapie agent in that the incubation period in mice is consistently shorter (approximately half).
3) There is a simple test for BSE.
4) Affected ewes mated with affected rams, produce offspring which nearly always become affected. If this were true of cattle, by keeping calves from sick animals. UK would never be free from BSE.
5) There was an urgent need to use the diagnostic test I had developed.
6)A study was needed to examine human brains from all suspect cases along with other neurological diseases using the sensitive test I had developed.
7)There were grounds for postulating that humans might possibly acquire SE through ingestion of contaminated tissue. It would be unwise to add potentially contaminated foods into the human food chain. Instead I attended a formal review meeting of my work on 23rd October 1990. The meeting was Chaired by Professor H Smith and attended by Dr J Smith, the Director of PHLS, Dr. C Bostock, a MAFF representative and Professor J Edwardson, an MRC representative and Dr N F. Lightfoot, the Director of PHLS Newcastle. Records of the minutes of the meeting revealed Professor Edwardson saying that Dr Perry and I would be a "recipe for mayhem" if I were given the go ahead to work with CJD.
The PHLS having realised what I had discovered during my investigations, received instructions from Mr Stephen Dorrell, Health Minister responsible for the PHLS "not to be involved or seen to be involved" with BSE CJD. PHLS following instructions and got rid of me but did nothing to stop public being exposed to the contaminated food or blood.
The confusion over the PHLS' position in relation to its involvement in BSE research became even more profound when on 27th March 1996 Mr Stephen Dorrell said in evidence to a Parliamentary Select Committee "in the case of Dr Narang, ... his employment with the PHLS has been brought to an end. The reason why his employment with the PHLS has been brought to an end has been stated many times in the media. That is because he was conducting a private research effort and not conducting himself as an employee of the PHLS in accordance with his contract of employment".
These were the main points the PHLS knew from the investigations in early 1990:
1) That one of the interviewees who had died from CJD had during his life often chopped bulls’ heads to feed his dogs.
2) That the husband of a woman who died of CJD had told me that he worked in a cattle auction and that he had regularly witnessed cattle with clinical symptoms of BSE being sold in auction.
3) That a butcher whose wife had died of CJD had told me that his wife had helped to kill animals with BSE symptoms in his back yard and that these animals had been sold for consumption.
4) The daughter whose mother had died of CJD and her father, who had died eleven and a half months later, contacted me to investigate the cause of her father’s death. The cause of death for her father was given as a stroke but she wished to check whether his death could have been CJD related.I diagnosed a large number of young patients with CJD using my urine test, while these cases were not even considered to be suffering with CJD. This forced the CJD Surveillance Unit and the government in 1996 to admit that BSE had infected humans.
I gave written and oral evidence to the BSE inquiry. I have devoted some 30 years of my professional career studying SE's. Some other scientists gave evidence to the BSE inquiry and covered five main features.
1. The nature of the agent
2. Test for BSE and CJD
3. Origin of BSE
4. Origin and Classification of CJD cases
5. Eradication of BSE
6. Vertical transmission occurs in scrapie, BSE and CJD
7. BSE in other animals. Many scientists who gave evidence to the BSE Inquiry, although it may appear that they were giving facts, it was only their opinion. Prusiner acting as a magician has engraved the prion hypothesis in peoples’ minds, like the Hans Christian Anderson story, The Emperors New Clothes. The truth is that prion is not the agent. Do MAFF know answer to the points mentioned above? Answer obviously is NO.
Well one should look at the position of MAFF and other so called BSE experts in the year 2000. Nearly 15 years since the first BSE case appeared, the bodies they empowered, funded with huge sums of money to investigate, just failed on all accounts. Within a matter of days, the Minister announced that some £10 million additional funds were being made available for BSE research. The following day I telephoned MAFF (Mr McGovern) asking for further details of these funds but was told that the money had already been spoken for. They simply conspired that I should not get no grant funding. Not that they do not know the nature of the agent but still do not know the origin of BSE. Millions of pounds have been spent with no results to show except number of cattle confirmed with BSE. How many of these cattle went into the food chain, no one knows.
In my view the above events demonstrate that the handling of the BSE crisis was influenced by the preferences and prejudices of civil servants whose main concern was to protect the well-being of the farming industry - and their own position - rather than to tackle the problem on a scientific basis. From the start of the crisis the situation was approached not as a matter of science but as a matter of policy, with Government bodies viewing research as some kind of store where the hypotheses convenient to them were selected.